The WTO is a prominent instance of growing suprastate governance in the globalizing world of the late twentieth century. 3 The new organization has given transworld regulation of trade a permanent institutional framework. The WTO's remit has rapidly expanded to cover not only cross-border movements of manufactures, but also trade in agricultural products and various services, intellectual property issues, foreign direct investment, trade and environment questions, competition policy, and more. The WTO Trade Policy Review Body conducts periodic suprastate surveillance of member governments' commercial measures. The organization's Dispute Settlement Body received over a hundred complaints during its first three years of operation, while the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) faced less than a hundred cases during the preceding half-century.
Although the operations and authority of the WTO integrally involve states, the global trade regime also has some relative autonomy from and power over the governments that subscribe to it. For one thing, the forces of globalizing markets and currently prevailing ideologies have been such that states are heavily constrained to join the WTO. Although, formally, membership has been a matter of 'sovereign choice', in effect governments have had little option but to approve the Uruguay Round accords. Trade Organization, member-states commit themselves to alter their laws, regulations and administrative procedures to conform with the suprastate trade regime. 4 Alleged violations of WTO rules are considered by panels of experts whose decisions are binding unless every state party to the global trade regime (including the initial complainant) votes to overturn the advice. 5 Already, even powerful states like Japan and the USA have received guilty verdicts from the WTO. More broadly, too, the consensus principle that prevailed in GATT operations from 1948 to 1994 has given way to a majority vote principle in its successor. 6 In addition, states may not make any reservations in respect of their membership of the WTO. 7 Not surprisingly, given this substantial growth in both the range and the authority of global trade law, many civic groups have developed considerable interest in the WTO.
As an important influence on the distribution of resources worldwide, the institution has come to occupy a prominent place on the agenda of numerous business lobbies, labour unions, farmers organizations, environmentalist groups, women's associations, development cooperation groups, consumer unions, human rights advocates, think tanks, and other elements of civil society. Many of these nonstate actors have sought direct contact with the WTO, bypassing government authorities in order to interrogate and lobby the multilateral institution itself.
This increase in approaches from civic organizations to the WTO has flowed in part from the recent enormous growth in civil society across most of the world. In the present context, 'civil society' refers to a broad collectivity of non-governmental, noncommercial, more or less formal organizations. It encompasses all those groups that, from outside official circles and firms (though sometimes closely linked with them), 4 One leading researcher of civil society has described (albeit perhaps with some hyperbole) 'a global "associational revolution" that may prove to be as significant to the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the latter nineteenth '. 8 For example, in the 1990s Kenya has counted some 23,000 registered women's groups, and more than 25,000 registered grassroots organizations have operated in the state of Tamil Nadu in India. 9 Significant parts of this expanding civil society have involved transborder affiliations. The number of active transborder civic groups (e.g. of religious believers, professionals, human rights campaigners, etc.) has increased more than tenfold since 1960, to a total of 16,000 in 1997. 10 
Benefits and Pitfalls
Before examining specific relationships between the World Trade Organization and civil society, it is good to reflect in general terms on the possible effects of those exchanges. Civil society is inherently neither good nor evil. It can both improve and harm policy. It can both enhance and detract from democracy. In short, civil society's contributions to post-Westphalian governance depend very much on the particular features of individual civic associations and official institutions and the wider sociohistorical conditions in which these actors operate.
Unlike the World Bank and UN development agencies, the WTO does not engage socalled 'operational' civic groups in the delivery of services. However, civil society offers the global trade regime at least six other potential benefits:
(1) civic associations can provide the WTO with information (both data and analysis) that is useful in policy formulation, implementation and review.
(2) civil society groups can stimulate debate about WTO policies, particularly by offering alternative perspectives, methodologies and proposals. Such challenges push the WTO better to clarify, explain, justify and perhaps rethink its positions. (1) the collection of civic associations that develops relations with the WTO might not adequately or fairly represent the various constituencies with a stake in the global trade regime. Civic contacts could thereby reproduce and even enlarge inequalities and arbitrary privileges connected with nationality, class, race, gender, religion, and so on.
(2) the WTO could treat overtures to civil society as merely a public relations exercise. The institution would thereby not only miss out on the valuable inputs indicated above, but also alienate many if not most of its potential civic partners.
(3) interventions from civil society into global governance of trade could be misdirected and/or ill-informed. Such low-quality involvement can unhelpfully disrupt institutional operations and policy development.
(4) the WTO could through its exchanges with civic groups become embroiled in local and national politics of which it has little understanding, perhaps undermining democracy in the process.
(5) the WTO could focus its exchanges with civil society on supportive groups to the neglect of challengers. As a result, the institution would get a false sense of popular endorsement of its policies. Indeed, such marginalization of critics (deliberate or unconscious) could generate a severe backlash against the global trade regime.
In sum, relations between civil society and the WTO can have far-reaching consequences -positive or negative -for the design and operation of the global trade regime. Given the previously described dynamics of politics in the contemporary globalizing world, it seems most unlikely that contacts between the WTO and civic associations will decline, let alone disappear. On the contrary, most indications suggest that these interchanges will further proliferate in the years to come. The challenge before the WTO and civil society is therefore to develop their mutual relationships in ways that minimize the pitfalls and maximize the benefits outlined above.
Civic Interest in the WTO
Civil society encompasses huge diversity. The multitude of civic associations exhibit widely differing constituencies, institutional forms, sizes, geographical coverage, resource levels, organizational cultures, orientations, goals, and tactics. In short, due caution is necessary when generalizing about civil society groups.
That said, we may loosely distinguish three types of civic organizations in terms of their general approach to the WTO. One group, whom we might call 'conformers', accept the established discourses of trade theory and broadly endorse the existing aims and activities of the WTO. A second group, whom we might call 'reformers', accept the need for a global trade regime, but seek to change reigning theories, policies and/or operating procedures. A third category of civic associations, whom we might call 'radicals', seek to reduce the WTO's competences and powers or even to abolish the institution altogether. The issues discussed so far relate to policy content, but many civic activists have sought also to change the operating procedures of the WTO. In particular they have advocated a democratization of the organization by giving citizens increased access to, and influence in, its proceedings and decisions. 27 
WTO Overtures to Civil Society
How has the World Trade Organization reacted to the various initiatives from civil society associations described above? The institution has during its short history already taken some steps to implement Article V of the Marrakesh Agreement. In brief, the WTO has: (a) adjusted its language to recognize civil society; (b) undertaken various outreach initiatives towards civic associations; (c) increased its public dissemination of information; and (d) made some alterations to substantive policy that (partly) meet civil society demands. These four positive developments are detailed below. On the other hand, as the next section will elaborate, the WTO has to date done relatively little to institutionalize relationships with civil society or to involve civic associations directly in policy deliberations. Nor has the organization so far made much use of contacts with civil society to guage the political viability of its policies.
In its discourse, the WTO has joined other global governance agencies in acknowledging the importance of civil society inputs to policy. For example, in his address to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, Ruggiero highlighted the presence of many 'representatives of non-governmental organizations, the business sector, and the media'. He went on to argue that: 32 a world trading system which has the support of a knowledgeable and engaged global community will be in a far stronger position to manage the forces of globalization for everyone's benefit.
At the Geneva Ministerial Conference, too, Ruggiero and several government leaders publicly endorsed the idea of increased relations between the WTO and civil society. 33 In this vein President Clinton of the USA proposed 'a forum where business, labour, environmental and consumer groups can speak out and help guide the further evolution of the WTO'. 34 At a time when UN bodies and the Bretton Woods institutions are continually speaking of 'stakeholders', 'ownership' and 'participatory development', the WTO can hardly speak another language.
The shift in discourse has been more than rhetorical insofar as the WTO has taken various initiatives to establish dialogue with civic groups. Its staff has provided many briefings to and received multiple representations from business associations, labour unions and NGOs. More elaborately, the Secretariat has since June 1994 organized four annual symposia with representatives of civil society on trade and sustainable development issues. 35 In September 1997 two dozen NGOs from four continents participated in a Joint WTO/UNCTAD Symposium on Trade-Related Issues Affecting
Least-Developed Countries. 36 At the Ministerial Conferences the WTO has provided civil society representatives with office space and media facilities. 37 The organization has also responded to demands from civil society for greater release of information concerning WTO policymaking. 
Shortfalls in Relations
Contributions from civil society to the global trade regime have clearly increased in both quantity and quality in the 1990s. Nevertheless, major additional advances would be required before civic inputs could realize their full potential (on the lines described A third general limitation in WTO-civil society relations -namely, a lack of veritable 'dialogue' -has mainly affected the institution's contacts with reformers and radicals.
These interchanges have often lacked sufficient openness and reciprocity, where the WTO on the one hand and activists on the other are fully ready to listen to, learn from, and be changed by each other. Such 'dialogues of the deaf' were particularly acute, for example, in early contacts between free traders at the WTO and environmentalists who automatically linked trade liberalization with increased environmental degradation. 46 Exchanges between the WTO and reformist groups have tended to become more cordial in the late 1990s. However, parties to WTO-civil society exchanges are still not as prepared as they could be to consider positions other than their own.
In sum, relations between the WTO and civil society have to date often succumbed to the potential dangers highlighted earlier. First, the exchanges have not been democratically representative. On the contrary, they have tended to reinforce structural inequalities in world politics. Second, on balance the WTO has not yet taken its contacts with civil society that far beyond public relations exercises. Third, on the whole civic groups have not provided the WTO with sufficient precisely formulated and carefully researched inputs. Fourth, the WTO has not given careful thought to the possible repercussions of its contacts with civil society on national and local politics in its member countries. Fifth, the WTO has for the most part skewed its contacts toward conformist groups, to the relative neglect of its reformist and radical critics, thereby 46 Williams, p. 110.
obtaining an artificially optimistic assessment of the popularity and viability of its policies.
To note shortfalls in relations between civil society and the WTO is not to advocate an abolition of these links, of course. As stressed before, the dynamics of contemporary governance are such that those exchanges are in effect irrepressible. We cannot return to a Westphalian world where 'international organizations' dealt only with states. The unavoidable challenge is therefore to forge relationships that maximize the contributions of civil society to effective and democratic global governance.
Constraints
In order to prescribe measures for improved relations between civil society and the WTO, one needs first to assess the causes of the problems. In a word, the shortfalls In sum, then, a host of resource limitations and structural constraints have together created substantial obstacles to the development of a wider and deeper dialogue between civil society and the WTO. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the contacts have had the partial, generally shallow, and often uneasy character described earlier.
Toward the Future
Exchanges between the World Trade Organization and civil society have become a notable feature of the global trade regime, much as civil society has become an In the first place, the parties can aim to clarify and specify their objectives. What, more precisely, are they trying to achieve by engaging with each other? The WTO in particular needs more explicit policy aims in regard to civil society.
Second, further steps can be taken formally to institutionalize relations between the WTO and civil society. Drawing on the experience of other global governance agencies, the WTO can devise mechanisms for permanent accreditation, observer status in relevant committees and panels, a regular cycle of consultations (extending the practice of the annual symposium with environmentalists), etc. Fifth, both civic organizers and WTO officials can consciously nurture attitudinal changes that promote more constructive dialogue. For instance, all participants in the relations can make more deliberate efforts to include otherwise marginalized circles.
The WTO and civic groups can also cultivate greater mutual recognition, respect and reciprocity. In addition, both civil society organizations and the WTO can become more sensitive to issues of their democratic accountability. To this end, all parties could inter alia do more to publicize their activities to each other and to the wider public.
None of the steps just described need be particularly costly or difficult. Given the substantial benefits of well-developed WTO-civil society relations -in terms of increasing information, stimulating debate, educating citizens, legitimating regimes, and democratizing politics generally -such initiatives are surely worthwhile.
